REPORTERNET.COM

The most worrying aspect of the recent string of Iranian terror attacks in Asia was the evident drive to commit them even though they hadn't been properly prepared.

The three attacks in New Delhi, Tbilisi and Bangkok did no more than wound one Israeli diplomat's wife. No Israelis were killed, and no high-quality target (like an embassy, passenger plane or official delegation ) was hit.
Those who sent the terrorists could have predicted that the results wouldn't justify the investment, and that compared to the assassinations of key Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyeh four years ago and of several Iranian nuclear scientists in recent months - all of which Tehran attributes to Israel - Iran would still end up behind in this bloody competition. And yet, it nevertheless rushed into action.
Such haste is not typical of Tehran's previous decision-making, and it shows that the decision makers are under pressure and liable to be driven more by emotions than by cool calculation. This may foretell escalation as well as a weakening of the restraints that have slowed progress on Iran's military nuclear program.
The working assumption of Western intelligence services is that Iran has been secretly deploying its forces so it could retaliate against American and Israeli targets. Iran could potentially gain by using these forces to create deterrence, but it's not worth acting for only limited effect: Scattering hints would be enough.
Like Hezbollah's cross-border kidnappings on July 12, 2006, it seems the recent attacks in Asia may have been a premature error. Israel's response to the former - the Second Lebanon War - dealt Iran a severe blow, by destroying much of Hezbollah's rocket arsenal (which has since been restored ) and changing Hezbollah's calculations regarding another round. This week's attacks risked antagonizing India, which has been Iran's lifeline from the tightening noose of economic sanctions; they will deepen Iran's diplomatic isolation; and they will spark efforts to uncover other Iranian agents stationed for use in emergencies. These are serious costs that domestic considerations (power struggles within Iran's ruling clique, the upcoming parliamentary elections, growing economic distress ) might explain, but certainly do not justify.
Moreover, from Iran's standpoint, Israel isn't a principal front. Iran has been actively engaged in fighting American and allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is now rushing to the aid of its embattled Syrian ally, President Bashar Assad. On the Israeli front, it has focused mainly on arming Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Thus the people available to carry out the attacks in India, Georgia and Thailand were probably not the star graduates of its sabotage courses.

(source: www.haaretz.com)